Displaying Published Materials 1 to 10 of 110

Arnold Polanski

• Is the General Public Licence a Rational Choice?

  Journal of Industrial Economics Vol. LV, 4, 2007

  Open/free source projects are networks of developers, distributors and end-users of non-proprietary created knowledge goods. It has been argued (e.g. [2], [10], [30]) that this form of organization has some advantages over the firm or market coordination. We show that for sufficiently convex and modular projects, proprietary licences are not able to sustain sequential knowledge production which, however, can be carried out if the project is run on the open source basis. JEL Classification: D45, D83, H41.

• A Decentralized Model of Information Pricing in Networks

  Journal of Econ Theory 136, 2007

  We propose a recursive method of pricing an information good in a network of holders and demanders of this good. The prices are determined via a unique equilibrium outcome in a sequence of bilateral bargaining games that are played by connected agents. If the information is an homogenous, non-depreciating good without network effects we derive explicit formulae which elucidate the role of the link pattern among the players. Particularly, we find out that the equilibrium price is intimately related to the existence of cycles in the network: It is zero if a cycle covers the trading pair and it is proportional to the direct and indirect utility that the good generates otherwise. JEL Classification: C 78.

• Bilateral Bargaining in Networks

  Journal of Econ Theory 134, 2007

  Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150). All pairs, that reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network). JEL Classification: C 78.

Boyd Black

• National Culture and Labour Market Flexibility.

  International Journal of Human Resource Management

• Labour Market Systems, Segregation and Gender Pay Inequalities: West Germany, The Netherlands and Great Britian

  Cambridge Journal of Economics.

• Culture and Effort: British and Irish Work-Related Values and Attitudes.

  International Journal of Human Resource Management

• Labour Market Incentive Structures and Employee Performance: an International Comparison.

  British Journal of Industrial Relations.

• Finance, Governance and the Employment Relationship: Evidence on Tenure, Training and Pay

  Written with H. Gospel and A.D. Pendleton - Industrial Relations

• 'Culturally Coded? The Enigma of Flexible Labour Markets'

  Employee Relations 23.4. 2001

• 'National Culture and Industrial Relations and Pay Structures'

  LABOUR Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations